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Abstract: In a nutshell, a biometric security system requires a user to provide
some biometric features which are then veriﬁed against some stored biometric tem-
plates. Nowadays, the traditional password based authentication method tends to
be replaced by advanced biometrics technologies. Biometric based authentication is
becoming increasingly appealing and common for most of the human-computer inter-
action devices. To give only one recent example, Microsoft augmented its brand new
Windows 10 OS version with the capability of supporting face recognition when the
user login in. This chapter does not intend to cover a comprehensive and detailed
list of biometric techniques. The chapter rather aims at brieﬂy discussing biometric
related items, including principles, deﬁnitions, biometric modalities and technologies
along with their advantages, disadvantages or limitations, and biometric standards,
targeting unfamiliar readers. It also mentions the attributes of a biometric system
as well as attacks on biometrics. Important reference sources are pointed out so that
the interested reader may gain deeper in-depth knowledge by consulting them.
Keywords: biometric modalities, biometric attacks, biometric standards.
1 Biometrics - Introduction
Let us begin with a simple scenario. Let us assume a user wants to remotely access a
tele-presence group with secured and restricted credentials. The access is done by launching
a veriﬁcation application requiring a password and user ID. Unfortunately, for some reasons,
the user does not remember the password. In this case, the application or system provides
a link for Forgot Password. The user needs then to type his e-mail address to which a new
temporary password is sent by the veriﬁcation system. The user enters his e-mail account, copies
the temporary password and the system asks the user to change again the temporary password
with a new more meaningful password. Moreover, the brand new password must be re-typed
to avoid any typo mistake. The whole process may take several minutes and requires the use
of the keyboard for several times, not mentioning memorizing or writing down the brand new
password. The action may become very frustrating and inconvenient for the user who might
become angry soon. Let us now consider there is another application which can get the user
access easily and very fast without requiring any typing and with a minimum user interaction or
eﬀort. Such applications already exist and they are based on user’s biometric features.
A biometric feature can be deﬁned as a physiological (face, ﬁngerprints, iris, etc.) or be-
havioural (gait, voice, signature, etc.) attribute of a human being that can discriminate one
individual from another. Nowadays, the great interest for biometric recognition systems can be
justiﬁed due to increased demand for security. The goal of a biometric based recognition system
is either automatic identiﬁcation or veriﬁcation of identities, given input data comprising im-
ages, speech or videos. Unlike the traditional ways, such as password, biometric traits have some
advantages: they cannot be stolen (although spoof attacks may exist to tamper the biometric
system), lost or forget. However, to be reliable, biometric traits should be unique and persistent
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over time. Some other criteria should be met such as user convenience and acceptability (mainly
due to privacy reasons). Biometric recognition is usually performed by extracting a biometric
template in query from the input device and compare it against some enrolled biometric tem-
plates. The comparison is processed using of the two modes: a) veriﬁcation (or authentication)
and b) identiﬁcation (or recognition). Veriﬁcation is an one-to-one process where the query face
is compared against the user claiming his genuine identity to verify his claimed ID. The output
is binary, either accept or reject, based on a matching procedure. We should note here that a
biometric authentication technology may be used in conjunction with traditional authentication
methods such as password, passports, PIN, smart cards, access tokens, etc, employed as second
factor authentication. Identiﬁcation is one-to-many process where the query is compared against
each enrolled biometric template (multiple templates) from the database to search for the identity
of the query. Identiﬁcation is a bit more complex than veriﬁcation as the system serves as both
identiﬁer and authenticator. A biometric based recognition system needs an enrollment proce-
dure which allows the registration of persons in a biometric database that may be later used for
identiﬁcation or veriﬁcation. The acquired initial data may undergo some pre-processing steps
depending on the biometric modality. For instance, in the case of images, histogram equalization
may help when the image suﬀers from illumination imbalance. For audio data, voice separation
from the background may be also a pre-processing step. Biometric features are constructed by
feature extraction step resulting a biometric template, further stored in the database. After a
person is enrolled, the person’s biometrics are scanned and matched against the enrolled biomet-
ric templates. Matching is a complex pattern recognition problem between the enrolled samples
and the test one. A matching score is computed to reﬂect the similarity between two biometric
templates. Overall, the person’s recognition process is challenging because the representation
of the same biometric is basically taken either by diﬀerent sensors or, more often, at two or
multiple diﬀerent points in time, so that the acquisition conditions between the enroll and test
samples may greatly vary due to various factors: noise, change in illumination, partial occlusion,
diﬀerent resolution, etc. This issue translates in a matching score lower than its optimum value.
A threshold level is next setup for a ﬁnal decision. A matching score higher than the threshold
would give a match and consequently an accept, while a lower score would lead to rejection.
The associated risks for any biometric system are false accept (when an unauthorized person
is wrongly accepted), represented by False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and false reject (when an
authorized person is incorrectly denied for access), represented by False Rejection Rate (FRR).
An ideal biometric system should have both FAR = FRR = 0. In real life, no such biometric
system or technology exists. While connected to the threshold level, FAR and FRR are inversely
proportional. More precisely, a low threshold level would decrease FRR and increase FAR. This
situation is preferred for applications where the level of security is not critical. However, for
applications demanding high security level, the threshold is set to a very high value to favour
low FAR in detriment of high (possible disturbing) FRR. One such applications is the authorized
and secure remote access for telepresence requiring very strict authorization. When FRR equals
FAR we have Equal Error Rate (EER), a measure that is often reported when the performance
of a biometric system or technology is addressed.
Biometric systems or technologies can be categorized based on several classiﬁcations: a)
physiological versus behavioural; b) cooperative versus non-cooperative; c) mono-modal versus
multimodal biometric systems; d) contact versus touchless versus “at distance” (or remote) tech-
nology, e) server based versus mobile based biometric technology; f) human versus no human
monitoring for data acquisition. The appropriateness of each classiﬁcation is highly depending
on the application type. For instance, a biometric based surveillance technology may operate
with full a) category (face as physiological and gait as behavioural) using non-cooperative user
interaction, remote sensors and server based processing (involving large video data), while the
Biometrics Systems and Technologies: A survey 317
contact based biometric type is fully absent. Similarly, a biometric authorization based access
for telepresence application might also require either contact or contactless sensing technology,
but no human monitoring is typically involved at the sensory remote spot.
2 Physiological versus Behavioural Biometrics
Physiological biometrics addresses direct measurement from parts of the human body, while
behavioural biometrics relates to measurements derived from human actions. In terms of acqui-
sition, behavioural biometrics need measurements acquired over a certain period of time which
is an important factor.
2.1 Physiological Biometrics
The majority of commercial biometrics technologies involve physiological measurements which
are considered to remain steady over relatively large time interval. Such measurements may in-
clude the following modalities:
• face recognition
• facial thermography
• ﬁngerprint recognition
• hand geometry based recognition
• ear geometry based recognition
• iris recognition
• retina recognition
• vascular pattern recognition
The above biometric modalities have, more or less, reached maturity. However, the per-
formance of such technologies are greatly dependent of application class. If, for a controlled
acquisition environment (high image resolution, good quality light, occlusion free and steady
images - a process preferable under external human monitoring) a face recognition technology
may easily acquire a very high matching score for an genuine individual, the matching score may
signiﬁcantly degrade for diﬀerent environmental conditions in the absence of a watching guard
compensating the ideal conditions. This case is speciﬁc for surveillance applications or, more
generally, when the remote biometric sensor is separated by the processing module location.
Moreover, in the absence of any preventive or detective control, an attacker can get access by at-
tacking the system with stolen biometric data (a printed photo of the genuine’s face, ﬁngerprint,
video record, etc.). The scenario is closely related to network authentication such as telepresence,
automated teller machine access, internet banking, mobile based biometrics, cloud technology.
For a centralized biometric network, authentication the user who needs to be authenticated is
physically present at the same site with the sensor while the recognition process takes place on a
general - purpose computer or server, located some distance away from the sensor. The remote
access is granted or rejected based on server decision which communicates with the sensor.
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Face Recognition
Face identiﬁcation and veriﬁcation dates back to 60’s when the computer vision community
has started to address the problem. While the face recognition technology is somehow inferior
as performance compared to other biometric modalities (such as iris recognition for example), it
is more accepted due to its major advantage: it is the only physiological biometric that can be
reliable measured at distance and, moreover, the authentication of the users can happen without
their explicit interaction with the sensor or their knowledge. The performance of face recognition
systems can vary considerable depending upon the context and various factors. The modiﬁcations
of facial features are caused by both long-term and short-term changes. Long-terms changes refer
to aging where prominent and wrinkles may appear upon the face and permanently change the
facial texture. In this case, periodic enrollment is necessary to update the biometric template.
Short - term changes may refer to weight loss or gain. Other factors aﬀecting the system’s
accuracy are partial occlusions (growing beard or moustache, glasses, hat, scarf) or various
environment conditions (distance from camera, varying lighting conditions, noise, motion blur,
etc). Another factor is given by face position. While the enrollment is usually taken in frontal
pose, the matching process may suﬀer from non-frontal pose acquisition, where pose estimation
might be needed.
The face recognition systems and technologies are based either on 2D or 3D representation
of the face appearance. The 2D based face biometrics systems are pose variant and rely on the
information conveyed in the gray level structure of the facial image (2D face texture), while the
3D approaches are pose invariant and involve the volumetric structure of the face along with
its depth map. The 3D image acquisition technologies come with diﬀerent cost and approaches.
The most cost-eﬀective solution called stereo acquisition is to use several calibrated 2D cam-
eras to acquire images simultaneously followed by 3D reconstruction. While the acquisition is
fast, this approach is highly light sensitive. Changes in illumination can lead to image artifacts
compromising the performance of the 3D face recognition system. An alternative is to project a
structured light pattern on the facial surface during acquisition. A third solution relies on active
sensing where a laser beam is scanning the face surface generating a reﬂected facial pattern.
Once the facial data are acquired, either as 2D or 3D, an automatic landmarking process is
necessary to detect facial interest points such as eyes, eyebrows, mouth contour, nose, chin, etc.
These landmarks are further used for face registration so that facial features (landmarks) are
localized at the same position (geometrical coordinates) across multiple face images. The process
continues with feature extraction and matching. For feature extraction, various techniques were
proposed, including subspace methods (principal component analysis, linear discriminant anal-
ysis, independent component analysis), ﬁltering approaches (diﬀerent implementation of Gabor
wavelets) or statistical approaches (including vacuous versions of local binary patterns). For the
last step, matching, methods starting from distance based classiﬁers (Euclidean distance, cosine
similarity measure) up to complex classiﬁers (neural networks or support vector machines) were
implemented. The literature presents an abundant source of methods and it is impossible to
provide references for all representative proposed techniques. The reader my consult the most
recent edited or authored face recognition books such as [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], where all related
aspects and techniques are presented in great details.
Facial Thermography
A very challenging issue for conventional face recognition systems is when they are operating
under low illumination environment. Oﬀ-the-shell methods to cope with this issue exist, but
their outcome is typically very noisy and the overall performance of this biometric system is
slightly improved. One solution is to shift from visible spectrum to infrared (IR) or near infrared
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(NIR) range that requires dedicated sensors. For long-wave IR (8 - 14 m) the human body
is a light source emitting heat due to the blood ﬂow under the skin and the resulting thermal
patterns can be collected in total darkness [7], [8], [9]. While an external light is not necessary,
these sensors are completely useless when the system operates in daylight, as usually happens.
This is because the body thermal patterns strongly interferes with the surrounding temperature
coming from artiﬁcial light or sunlight. Alternatively, less heat sensitive near infrared spectrum
- NIR (0.8 - 2.5 m) can also be used. For a reliable functioning, the NIR sensor need an
ambient light. Studies have reported, however, modest performances of somewhere between
84% and 93% [10], [11]. This is due to the fact that many facial texture patterns that are
clearly distinctive in the visible spectrum are absent in the IR or even NIR facial imagery, thus
lowering the discriminant capability of facial thermography based biometrics systems. Facial
thermography is aﬀected by medical conditions such as, for example, fever.
Fingerprint Recognition
The ﬁngerprint recognition is perhaps the most used biometric having applications in both
law enforcement and computer systems, having a mature and widely accepted technology. The
technology is implemented on various platforms and devices, including laptops, mobile phones
or personal digital assistants. Conventional ﬁngerprint systems belong to touch-based sensing
technology and require touching or rolling a ﬁnger onto a rigid surface with a live-scan device.
One disadvantage is the usability aspect as the system depends on the ﬁnger placement, ﬁnger
scarfs or skin conditions (dirt, sweat, moisture). To make them robust against skin conditions,
touchless ﬁngerprint technologies are emerging. Two classes exist: reﬂection - based touchless
ﬁnger imaging (RTFI) and transmission-based touchless ﬁnger imaging (TTFI). In the case
of RTFI there are 2 light sources illuminating the ﬁngerprint [12]. The ﬁnger must absorb
only a small portion of the incident light, while the majority of light is reﬂected back to the
optical detector. The device must be designed to allow diﬀerent light quantity absorbed by the
ﬁngerprint’s valleys compared to the light absorbed by the ridges to assure a good contrast. The
other parameters such as the depth-of-focus and ﬁeld-of-view of the camera, the irradiation and
the frequency of the light sources are also crucial for reliable performance when the skin condition
changes from dry to wet. The light sources has to be placed as close as possible to detector to
minimize the shadowing eﬀect and the emitted light should be in the blue spectrum (around 500
nm wavelength). The design is very complex and acquiring an optimum image contrast is not
an easy task, leading to expensive devices compared to the touch-based ﬁngerprint devices. The
other approach, TTFI is similar to the optical coherence tomography principle where the light is
transmitting through the ﬁnger [13] and the light that is back-scattered from the skin tissue is
captured. The ﬁnger is placed between the light source and detector so that the light illuminates
the nails side of the ﬁnger while the opposite ﬁnger part is oriented towards the detector. A
red light with wavelength of 660 nm is used here because this wavelength corresponds to the
maximum transmittance ratio to the skin tissue. The light penetrate the ﬁnger and then collected
by the detector. Apart from high cost for the touchless ﬁngerprint recognition technology, the
curvature of the ﬁnger represents another limitation of this technology resulting in a relatively
low interest for commercial adoption. The latter issue can be solved by employing a multi-vision
system consisting of several cameras located on a semicircle and pointing out to the center of the
ﬁnger. Such device may contain ﬁve cameras along with a set of green LED arrays to illuminate
the ﬁnger [14]. Once the ﬁnger is in the correct position, each LED array is set to a speciﬁc light
intensity and the ﬁve cameras start capturing a picture of the ﬁnger simultaneously. Using ﬁve
cameras a enlarged (180 degree) ﬁeld-of-view is obtained and the views are combined together
to form a 3D ﬁnger reconstruction.
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Hand Geometry based Recognition
Hand geometry based recognition systems consider the measurement of length, width, thick-
ness, and surface area of the ﬁngers and hand [15]. This biometric oﬀers low security level
because it is not scalable, i.e. those measurements do not tend to be unique for large-scale
identiﬁcation systems [16]. One important inconvenient is that such biometric systems require
complex hardware to capture the hand image and may not be appropriate for computer-based
login [17].
Iris Recognition
Iris recognition is the most reliable type of biometric identiﬁcation. It is considered to be the
ideal biometric in terms of uniqueness and stability (its features do not vary over time) leading
to massive deployment for large-scale systems that proved to be very eﬀective [18]. The iris is the
colored portion of the eye surrounding the pupil and the biometric system searches for its speciﬁc
intricate patterns composed of many furrows and ridges. The basic steps are: image acquisition,
iris localization using landmark features and segmentation, biometric template generation and
biometric template matching. The acquisition factors are resolution, signal/noise ratio, contrast
and illumination wavelength. Once the iris is segmented, it may suﬀer a pseudo-polar coordinate
transformation operation to take into account variations in pupil size. To capture the iris image,
the conventional iris recognition technology requires a very short focal length, increasing the
intrusiveness of this approach. However, iris recognition systems where the iris image is captured
at longer distance exist nowadays. While for short focal length the image resolution is not
an issue, this becomes very challenging with increasing distance, leading to signiﬁcant drop in
accuracy. Iris biometric technologies operating at long distance (beyond 1 m) are developed by
various vendors. For instance, AOptix has implemented a system able to operate within a range of
1.5 - 2.5 m [19]. They have also developed a system having onboard coaxial imaging and adaptive
optics to facilitate the capture of iris image at up to 18 m. Another vendor, Honeywell [20] has
designed a combined face and iris recognition system that is capable of acquiring face and iris
images at distances from 1 m and beyond 4 m. Carnegie Mellon University’s CyLab Biometrics
Center have been developing an iris recognition solution for the past several years that can
successfully identify subjects from up to 12 meters away [21]. However, regardless of technology,
one important aspect with the iris recognition systems is that the approach is not applicable
when the user has contact lens.
Retina Recognition
In order to obtain retinal images, an infrared camera is used to capture the unique pattern
of veins located at the back of the eye. Similarly to iris recognition, this modality also suﬀers
from the problem of user inconvenience, which is even more inconvenient as the user is asked to
carefully present their eyes to the camera at very close proximity. Another inconvenient is that
this approach requires complex and expensive dedicated hardware, making such solution to be
limited to applications with very high security demands [22]. On a positive side, unlike face, iris
or ﬁngerprint biometrics, retina based patterns are very diﬃcult to spoof.
Vascular Pattern Recognition
This approach uses the subcutaneous vascular network on the back of the hand for speciﬁc
individual patterns which are distinctive even for identical twins. A near-infrared light is emitted
toward the back or palm of the hand. The reﬂected light prints an image on the sensor, image
representing the encoded absorbance of blood vessels [23]. Due to the hemoglobin presented
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in the blood, the veins appear as dark areas pattern and clearly delimited. The image is next
digitized and speciﬁc features including vessel branching points, thickness, or branching angles
are extracted as distinct features.
2.2 Behavioural Biometrics
The behavioural biometrics typically measures the behaviour of the user over time. This
biometric type usually does not explicitly ask the user to be cooperative and thus, it is more
transparent, user-friendly, less intrusive and more convenient than their physiological counter-
parts. On the downside, the behavioural biometrics suﬀers from low level of uniqueness and
permanence, compared to the physical biometrics. Moreover, their accuracy for authentication
is lower and are rather more suitable for veriﬁcation. The approaches can be split into the
following classes:
• gait recognition
• keystroke analysis based authentication
• mouse dynamics
• speaker recognition
Gait recognition
Analyzing the way an individual walks is the key issue for the gait recognition systems. The
main advantage is the fact that this approach has no physical contact being ideal for acquiring
data at long distance with low resolution. The ﬁne details are not crucial here, rather the
movement time patterns are considered. Such systems are inﬂuenced by external factors such
as footwear walking surface or clothing. The gait recognition systems can be classiﬁed either as
model based or appearance based [24]. Model based approaches ﬁt a model representing time
pattern of the human anatomy against video data then extracting and analyzing its parameters.
Appearance model based approaches analyze the silhouette shape and motion of an individual
and the way this vary in time. The images are recorded while the individual walks in a plane
normal to the camera view. The performance of these biometric systems are highly dependent
on the camera viewpoint. A change in the walking direction can negatively inﬂuence their
performance. By using geometric cues, some systems improve viewpoint invariance when dealing
with 2D imagery. Another alternative is to use 3D human ﬁgure capturing to have viewpoint
independence. Both 2D and 3D approaches are described in great details in [24].
Keystroke analysis based authentication
Keystroke analysis based authentication is deﬁned as the process of recognizing an individual
from his typing characteristics. The veriﬁcation can be performed either static (text-dependent)
or dynamic (text-independent) mode. The characteristics are typically composed of the time
between successive keystrokes, more precisely the inter-stroke latency, time durations between
the keystrokes, dwell times (i.e. the time a key is pressed down), overall typing speed, frequency of
errors (use of backspace), use of numpad, etc. For a large scale application, these characteristics
are not unique amongst too many users. Therefore this analysis cannot be reliable used as
recognition feature (although some report indicate this could also be possible [25]), but they can
be suitable for veriﬁcation systems. Aside from relative low accuracy, the enrollment procedure is
the major drawback of such behavioural biometric systems. To generate representative biometric
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templates the user might be asked to repeat the enroll procedure by providing a username,
password or a speciﬁc text for a large number of times. An interesting application is presented
in [26] where the keystroke dynamics based authentication has been analyzed in the context of
collaborative systems.
Mouse dynamics
A behavioural proﬁle can be also constructed using mouse actions performed by an user.
Mouse derived features are easy to handle without user’s knowledge. The mouse authentication
involves registration phase and login phase. A template is built using the mouse features captured
at the time of registration. The same template is compared with login details which are captured
by the mouse task. In case of laptop, touchpad helps to extract the mouse features. The mouse’s
sensitivity aﬀects the performance. The mouse features include general movement, drag and
drop, stillness, point and click (single or double) actions, [27], [28].
Speaker recognition
Speaker recognition is the most researched behavioural biometric. Although the voice produc-
tion considers the physical aspects of the mouth, nose and throat, this biometric is considered as
behavioural type because the pronunciation and the manner of speech is intrinsically behavioural.
The speciﬁc voice features refer to various analysis such as amplitude spectrum, localization of
spectral peaks related to the vocal tract shape or pitch striations related to the user’s glottal
source. Similar to keystroke analysis, the speaker recognition can be performed either in static
(text-dependent) or dynamic mode (text-independent) mode [29]. In the text-dependent mode
the use is asked by the biometric system to pronounce a particular phrase, while, in the case of
the text-independent mode the user is free to speak any phrase. In the latter case the veriﬁcation
accuracy usually improves as the text length increases. In between, a pseudo-dynamic mode ex-
ists where the user is requested to say two numbers randomly previously enrolled in a database.
As principle, the normalized amplitude of the input signal is decomposed into several band-pass
frequency channels with the purpose of feature extraction. The type of the extracted feature
may vary. Typical features are the Fourier transform of the voice signal for each channel, along
with some extra information consisting in pith, tone, cadence or shape of the larynx. Amongst
behavioral biometric systems, the speaker recognition is the most accurate behavioral approach.
Nevertheless, the voice might be perturbed by various factors such as illness, emotional or mental
state or even age, conducting to inaccurate results.
3 Mobile and Web-based Biometrics Technology
According to Acuity Market Intelligence, the mobile biometric market will technically ex-
plode from $1.6 billion in 2014 to $34.6 billion in 2020 [30]. This prediction is foreseen for all
biometric sensors (modalities) embedded in smart mobile devices (smart phones, tablets, and
intelligent wearables. Another mobile biometrics considered also refer to biometric applications
oﬀered by vendors or mobile service providers, including retailers, payment procedures or banks.
A third identiﬁed biometric sector is given by payment or non-payment transactions using secure
web (cloud)-based services augmented with biometric authentication option. The report claimed
that 100% of smart mobile devices will include embedded biometric sensors as a standard feature
by 2020. According to the report, each year, more than 800 billion transactions requiring dif-
ferent level of biometric authentication will be processed, while more than 5.5 billion biometric
applications are foreseen to be downloaded.
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The aforementioned statistics come with no surprise. Millions of internet users experience a
malware or hacker attack each year. The situation is even more critical with the use of mobile
access where losses to fraud or identity theft are measured in the hundred of billions of dollars.
Thus, implementing more authentication modalities by replacing the conventional ways with
biometrics for mobile devices seems to be a reliable solution. Mobile biometrics solutions are
implemented by device manufacturers as well as independent vendors as third-parties which oﬀer
software solutions. Intel Security Division has developed a biometric authentication application
relying either on face or ﬁngerprint named TrueKeyTM [31], application available for various
platforms either server-based or mobile. Another company, Sensory, released an authentication
application named TrulySecureTM that combines voice and vision (face-based) authentication
for mobile phones, tablets, and PCs [32]. Fingerprints, face, iris palm print or voice biometric
authentication and veriﬁcation solutions are developed by Neurotechnology [33].
Mobile technology also incorporates various biometric modalities. Devices with built-in ﬁn-
gerprint sensors exist on the market. One example is TouchID ﬁngerprint technology developed
for iPhone 5S by Apple, that incorporates a ﬁngerprint module. Samsung also came up with
ﬁngerprint solution for its Samsung’s Galaxy Tab S model as well as Samsung Galaxy S6 model.
Vision based authentication solutions are allowed by all smartphones which integrate high resolu-
tion cameras into their hardware, facilitating third-parties to easily develop such software based
authentication options. Other mobile or web-based biometric technology vendors include Applied
Recognition with Ver-ID for various applications [34]. Notable, a facial biometric application has
been recently released by IsItYou augmented with a unique anti-spooﬁng mechanism [35].
To address the interoperability among authentication devices a Fast IDentity Online (FIDO)
Alliance was formed in 2012 [36], including powerful partners such as Google, Paypal, Miscrofsot,
MasterCard, GitHub or DropBox. The alliance works towards creating secure interfaces between
FIDO-enabled biometric devices and cloud-based website by developing dedicated plugins. FIDO
is very active in deﬁning web-based related biometric standards and a great impact is foreseen
for macroeconomic application. Recently (November 2015), FIDO submitted to the World Wide
Web Consortium three technical speciﬁcations with the purpose of deﬁning a web-based API to
be integrated into all web browsers and platform to facilitate a strong and secure authentication
option.
4 Biometrics Attack
Similar to hacking a conventional authentication modality (password, token, etc), eﬀorts have
been made to hack or break a biometric authentication systems. A potential attack against a
biometric system is possible for any component of the system. The network distributed (web-
based) systems are more vulnerable to the attacks compared to the stand-alone biometric systems.
This is due to the fact that, for a stand-alone biometric system, all processes are performed into
a single processing unit. On the contrary, for physically disparate biometric systems, the attack
may also occur in the transmission path, or any server performing the authentication.
The most common attack is the one against the sensor. When the samples acquisition process
is fully automated (i.e. no watching guard exists to monitor the acquisition process) an impostor
can easily bypass the system by simply presenting a copy of biometric data of a legitimate user in
front of the sensor. The attempt of breaking the biometric system using such method is named
spooﬁng attack. To date, there is no commercial biometric technology that is robust against
such attacks.
The copy may come in various formats, depending on the biometric modality. In the case
of facial biometric, the impostor may present a still image, video sequence playback, or even
a 3D silica or rubber mask of the genuine user. A demonstration carried out by the Security
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and Vulnerability Research Team of the University of Hanoi drawn attention regarding this issue
by bringing evidence on how easy is to bypass the biometric systems namely Lenovo’s Veriface
III, Asus’ SmartLogon V1.0.0005, or Toshibas Face Recognition version 2.0.2.32 - each set to
its highest security level, using fake facial images of the valid user and thus gaining illegitimate
access to the laptops [37]. This vulnerability was also tested in the spooﬁng challenge competition
organized as special session at ICB 2013 [38]. These examples clearly point out the weaknesses
of such systems and emphasize the necessity of incorporating reliable anti-spooﬁng mechanisms
into the FA systems. Hence, not surprisingly, many research works were devoted to ﬁnd robust
solutions for detecting spooﬁng attacks. Within the same framework, a competition on counter
measures to 2D facial spooﬁng attacks was also settled at ICB 2013 where anti-spooﬁng methods
were evaluated [39]. The spooﬁng attack issue for various biometrics (face, iris, ﬁngerprint, gait,
etc) is a theme for the FP7 funded project TABULA RASA, where the topic was intensively and
speciﬁcally addressed and analyzed [40]. Various solutions have been proposed to detect spooﬁng
attacks. The spoof detection approaches may fall into four categories: a) challenge response based
methods requiring user interaction, b) behavioral involuntary movements detection for parts of
the face and head, c) data - driven characterization, and d) presence of special anti-spooﬁng
devices. Google proposed a blinking based antispooﬁng mechanism [41].
The ﬁngerprint modality can also be easily spoofed, as ﬁngerprints are left behind on many
objects the user touches. An impostor can use the same approach deployed by law enforcement
agencies for lifting the ﬁngerprints. Once lifted, a duplicate can be easily constructed from
silicon or gelatin material. By so doing, in 2002, Matsumoto successfully fooled eleven diﬀerent
commercial ﬁngerprint readers, with both optical and capacitive sensors, and some with live ﬁnger
detection option, with a rate of success of 80% [42]. Matsumoto created a copy of a live ﬁnger
as well as an artiﬁcial ﬁnger using a latent ﬁngerprint left on a glass also accepted as genuine.
Eleven years later (i.e. 2013), a biometrics hacking team of the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) has
successfully bypassed the biometric security of Apple’s TouchID implemented on iPhone 5S and
Samsung Galaxy S5 [43]. Regarding Samsung’s S5 biometric authentication system, the team
claimed that not only it was possible to spoof the ﬁngerprint authentication system, even after
the device has been turned oﬀ, but the system also allows for seemingly unlimited authentication
attempts without ever requiring a password, which was unacceptable. Two more years later, the
vulnerability remains as it was reported at the Blackhat hacking conference in Las Vegas by
Zhang et al. [44]. Similar to facial spooﬁng challenge competition, an iris and ﬁngerprint based
live detection competition is open [45]. The most recent report (2015) conﬁrms the issue is still
not solved, although some improvements exist [46].
Spooﬁng a real iris with a good quality image is also possible. Gupta et al. [47] used a
commercial SDK, VeriEye [48] and successfully spoofed the system with printed images of iris.
Finally, voice impersonation can be applied to trick both automated and human veriﬁcation
for voice authentication systems [49]. A legitime user’s voice can be recorded in various ways,
including close proximity between the attacker and user, throughout a spam call or searching
for audio-video recordings over the Internet. With the help of a voice morphing program, the
attacker may synthesize the user’s voice by using just a few samples. The cloned voice “borrowed”
the features of the authentic voice and the authors successfully fooled the speaker authentication
system that was based on the Bob Spear Speaker Veriﬁcation System [50]. Their ﬁndings were
alarming, i.e. the system was able to reject only 20 % of fake voices.
5 Attributes of Biometric Technology
The biometric systems and technologies is expected to posses several characteristics to be
practically usable, as follows:
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• Universality. This is the ability for a speciﬁc biometric system to be applied to a whole
population of users. This is directly connected to Failure to Enroll (FTE) condition that
refers to the case when a part of the population may not be enrolled for whatever reason.
On particular reason is when the individual does not have the required biometric, leading
to Failure to Enroll (FTA) error. A person suﬀering from mutism can not be enrolled with
a speaker recognition technology; a ﬁngerprint system can not be used for persons with
missing ﬁngers, etc.
• Uniqueness. The ability to successfully discriminate people. The biometric features must
be as distinct as possible from one individual to another. The biometric features must
convey large diﬀerences between individuals (large inter-class variability) while having small
diﬀerence between samples taken from the same individual (small intra-class variability).
• Permanence. The ability of biometric features not to change over time. Some features
do not change (iris, ﬁngerprint patterns, vascular system, etc.) while others do (facial
features). For time varying features a periodic biometric update is required.
• Collectibility. The ability of the system to perform the acquisition for any occasion (re-
gardless of environment change, such as change in illumination, etc). There are cases where
the acquisition process can not be performed for the same individual previously enrolled.
For example, if the person suﬀers some skin condition destroying the epidermis or gets a
serious scar on his ﬁnger, the ﬁngerprint biometric authentication system will more likely
output a false reject due to signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the enroll and test biometric
features. Similar scenario is possible for people suﬀering from cataract when tested with
an iris authentication system, or people undergoing facial plastic surgery recovering from
accidents or facial injury, when tested against a facial biometric system.
• Simplicity. Recording and transmission should be easy to use and not error-prone.
• Cost-eﬃciency. The whole process should be cost-eﬃcient.
• Acceptability. The degree to which a biometric technology is found acceptable by the
society. Typically, gross invasive biometric technologies (such as retina based systems) are
tend to be less acceptable than those using non-invasive approaches (such as vision based
or touchless sensors). Another aspect to be considered is the access to privacy.
• Scalability. This attribute refers to the ability of the system to accommodate a large number
of enrollment individuals while providing a reasonable accuracy. The degree of scalability
is application dependent. For instance, when using a biometric-based lock option for a
mobile device with the intent to lock some speciﬁc applications inside the device, only
one (device’s owner) or a few individuals (perhaps family’s members) would enroll. The
matching is then either one-to-one or one-to-few type and the scalability is not an issue.
On the contrary, for a network distributed system (such as bank application or decision
systems) the number of enrolled individuals might easily reach millions and the system
should cope with this overwhelming data. For such large-scale biometric application its
performance (accuracy, FRR and FAR) is more critical. More exactly, one false rejection
a month might be acceptable, but hundreds false rejection a day would be disastrous. The
same rationale applies to FAR. Just to give a simple example, let us suppose a biometric
system is 99.9% accurate. That is, if someone is an attacker, there is a 1-in-1000 chance
that the biometric system fails to detect the attacker (outputs a false accept), while the
same chance would be for a legitimate user to be denied as false attacker.
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• Resilience. The ability of the system to handle exceptions. An example would be an
individual whose biometric features might not be easily acquired. If a user has a broken
arm, he may need human intervention to use a hand or ﬁngerprint based biometric system.
• Circumventable. The ability of the system to detect attacks. An important role has the
sensor that should be tamper-proof.
6 Biometric Standards
As noted throughout the chapter, a network distributed biometric technology involves several
components, including the sensor, the communication channel, the web-based decisional server,
components that rely on diﬀerent hardware architecture. Not only the hardware is diﬀerent but
also the integrated software is diﬀerent for each hardware conﬁguration. Moreover, a fully oper-
ational system working on a speciﬁc operating system is not compatible with another operating
system. Another representative example is provided by the multi-modal biometric systems rely-
ing on two or multiple biometric modalities (face, ﬁngerprint, voice, as an example) that yield
individual scores which are ﬁnally fused to output a single matching score. Without a common
format that has to be shared among these modalities, the multi-modal biometric system can not
operate. Finding mechanisms for each component of the biometric system to communicate has
leaded to standardization. There are several working groups concerning biometric standards.
At international level, the International Standard Organisation (ISO) and International Elec-
trotechnical Commission (IEC) play a signiﬁcant role. ISO and IEC have established a Joint
Technical Committee 1 JTC 1/SC 37 [51] to ensure a high priority, focused, and comprehensive
approach worldwide for the rapid development and approval of formal international biometric
standards. There are several aspects to consider, including Data Interchange Formats, Data
Structure Standard and Technical Interface Standards.
• Data Interchange Format represents the lowest level of interoperability between systems
using the same modality and addresses the actual representation of the biometric data
itself. The number and type of features can vary considerable depending upon the matching
algorithm. There is a need to format these features so that the other components of the
system may properly interpret the transmitted information.
• Once the data is formatted it needs to be transmitted. Data Structure Standard addresses
this by providing the necessary wrapper around the biometric data within the so called
Common Biometric Exchange File Format to facilitate interoperability between diﬀerent
systems or system components, forward compatibility for technology improvement, and
software hardware integration. Data Interchange Format Standards provide the mecha-
nism for extraction, matching and decision modules of the biometric system. The main
component of this standard is the Biometric Information Record composed of three parts.
The ﬁrst part named the Standard Biometric Header contains information to an applica-
tion regarding the format of and other properties of the next part named the Biometric
Data Block that contains the biometric data conforming to a deﬁned format. The third
part named the Security Block provides information related to the encryption protocol and
the integrity of the Biometric Information Record.
• Technical Interface Standards provide an Application Programming Interface (API) by
deﬁning the format for the Biometric Information Record so that components can un-
derstand and interpret records. A representative standard is BioAPI [52] that deﬁnes
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a framework for installing the components, making them compliant with plug-and-play
concept. BioAPI tries to hide as much as of unique attributes of individual biomet-
ric technologies, vendor implementations, products and devices. A Biometric Service
Provider could then plug the components throughout a Service Provider Interface. An
application can use biometric services using two fundamental ways: either through prim-
itive functions or through abstract functions. Primitive functions are the most basic
functions and relates to BioAPI Capture, BioAPI Process, BioAPI V erifyMatch
and BioAPI IdentifyMatch. The abstract functions are deﬁned by BioAPI Enroll,
BioAPI V erify and BioAPI Identify.
The standardization of biometric technology leaded to proper interoperability between and
within biometric systems, ensuring a cost-eﬀective technology implementation.
7 Conclusions
This paper only brieﬂy touches the main issues of biometric systems and technologies, point-
ing out their diﬀerences, modalities, open problems and standardization. Their performance
greatly vary upon the operating and external conditions as no universal biometric technology
exists. The best performance is obtained where the technology is designed for strict controlled
conditions and where data acquisition is accomplished under human supervision. Not mention-
ing a possible accuracy drop, when no human guard is present, a biometric system can be easily
attacked and spoofed, a critical open issue yet to be solved. Intensive work is still undergoing to
improve their performance while protecting them against various attacks.
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